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Abstract
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derpays some agent by at least one-third of a dollar for some consistent profile
of evaluations. I then produce an impartial division rule that never underpays or
overpays any agent by more than one-third of a dollar, and for most consistent
evaluation profiles does much better.
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1. Introduction.
A principal hires three agents to work together on a project. The principal agrees
to pay the team a fixed sum when the project is completed. It must be decided how to
allocate the fixed sum among the three agents. The only information available consists of
agents’ evaluations of the relative contributions of their partners. For example, agent 1
might report that agent 3’s contribution was five times as great as agent 2’s; agent 2 might
report that agent 1’s contribution was seven times as great as agent 3’s; and agent 3 might
report that agent 1’s contribution was 35 times as great agent 2’s. A rule is needed in the
form of a division function that will input the peer evaluations and output the amounts
the agents will receive.
Three desirable properties of a division function are exactness, impartiality and con-
sensuality. A division function is exact if it always outputs amounts that add up to the
fixed sum; impartial if the amount paid to an agent is independent of that agent’s report;
consensual if the amounts paid to the agents respect the peer evaluations whenever those
evaluations are consistent. (In the example above the evaluations are consistent since
5× 7 = 35. A consensual division rule would assign agents 1,2 and 3 the fractions 35/41,
1/41 and 5/41 of the fixed sum, respectively.)
Unfortunately, de Clippel et al. (2008) showed that in the three-agent case a divi-
sion function cannot be exact, impartial and consensual. There remains the problem of
choosing a division function that satisfies at most two of the three desirable properties.
We require exactness since in our version of the problem the principal is committed to
paying out a fixed sum. We will investigate exact, impartial division functions, which
eliminates strategic considerations. In what follows we will determine the extent to which
an exact, impartial division function must deviate from consensuality. We will adopt a
worst case measure of deviation from consensuality. More exactly, we define the deviation
from consensuality of a division function to be the supremum of the absolute value of the
difference between the amount assigned to an agent by the given division function and the
amount assigned by a consensual division function. Here the supremum is taken over all
three agents and over all consistent peer evaluations. We find that the minimum deviation
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from consensuality for an exact, impartial division function is 1/3. We also produce an
exact, impartial division function with that minimal deviation. This division function is
also symmetric with respect to agents, and each agent’s payoff is increasing in each of her
evaluations by her partners.
Dividing a resource of a fixed size among a fixed number of agents is a problem that
can take on a number of forms. Thomson (2003) surveys the literature pertaining to the
resolution of conflicting claims over a resource. There is also a literature on cake cutting
and pie cutting that focuses on fair division of a divisible good, parts of which are valued
differently by different parties. Brams et al. (2006) provide a recent contribution to this
literature. de Clippel et al. (2008) raised the question at hand, that of dividing a dollar
using a rule that depends only on agents’ evaluations of their associates. They showed
that in the three-agent case there can be no exact, impartial, consensual rule. They
also explored exact, impartial, consensual rules for more than three agents. Tideman and
Plassman (2008) studied the extent to which the unique impartial, consensual division rule
fails to be exact in the three-agent case. Our study can be thought of as complementary
to the three-agent section of their paper, since we study the extent to which all impartial,
exact division rules fail to be consensual in the three-agent case.
The result establishing 1/3 as the minimal deviation from consensuality of a three-
agent exact, impartial division function, and discussion of an example are contained in
Section 3, which is preceeded by a preliminary section and followed by some concluding
remarks.
2. Preliminaries.
Three agents complete a project and submit peer evaluations r = (r1, r2, r3) where
agent i’s evaluation is ri = (rij,k, r
i
k,j) ∈ [0,+∞]× [0,+∞] with {i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3}, j < k
and rik,j =
1
ri
j,k
, including the conventions 0 = 1+∞ and +∞ = 10 . The evaluation ri =
(rij,k, r
i
k,j) indicates that agent i asserts that agent j’s contribution to the project was r
i
j,k
times as great as agent k’s contribution.
Payments are assigned to the agents according to the division function
f(r) = (f1(r), f2(r), f3(r)) where 0 ≤ fi(r) < +∞ for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Now we set the fixed
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payment sum at 1 for the sake of simplicity. The division function is exact if f1(r) +
f2(r) + f3(r) = 1 for every peer evaluation profile r. The division function f is impartial
if for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3} agent i’s payment fi does not depend on ri. Then we can write
fi(r) = fi(r
j
k,i, r
k
j,i) for (i, j, k) ∈ T = {(1, 2, 3), (2, 3, 1), (3, 1, 2)}.
Peer evaluations are consistent if r123r
2
31 = r
3
21 or if one of r
1
23 and r
2
31 is 0 and the
other is +∞. The division function is consensual if it respects consistency, that is, if
f1(r) + f2(r) + f3(r) = 1 and fi(r) = rki,jfj(r) for {i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3} both hold when
evaluations are consistent, with the convention a = +∞× 0 for all a ∈ [0, 1].
3. Exact and Impartial Division Functions.
As mentioned above, de Clippel et al. (2008) showed that for three agents a divi-
sion function cannot be exact, impartial and consensual. We will now investigate exact,
impartial division functions to determine the extent to which they must deviate from
consensuality.
Suppose f is an exact, impartial division function. Then for (i, j, k) ∈ T = {(1, 2, 3),
(2, 3, 1), (3, 1, 2)} and any peer evaluation profile r,
fi(r
j
k,i, r
k
j,i) + fj(r
k
i,j, r
i
k,j) + fk(r
i
j,k, r
j
i,k) = 1 (1)
Setting rij,k = 1, for (i, j, k) ∈ T and (rjk,i, rkj,i) ∈ [0,+∞]× [0,+∞]
fi(r
j
k,i, r
k
j,i) = 1− fj(rki,j, 1)− fk(1, rji,k) (2)
From (2) we see that if f is an exact, impartial division function, then each fi is additively
separable. We also have the following.
Proposition 1. If f is an exact, impartial division function, then
∑3
i=1 fi(1, 1) = 1.
Proof: Let rij,k = r
j
k,i = r
k
i,j = 1 for (i, j, k) = (1, 2, 3). The conclusion follows from (1).
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Proposition 2. If f is an exact, impartial division function and ai, bi ∈ [0,+∞] for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then ∑3i=1 fi(ai, 1) +∑3i=1 fi(1, bi) ≤ 3.
Proof: For (i, j, k) ∈ T , from (2) fi( 1bk , 1aj ) = 1− fj(aj, 1)− fk(1, bk). Then summing over
T ,
3∑
i=1
fi(
1
bk
,
1
aj
) = 3−
3∑
j=1
fj(aj, 1)−
3∑
k=1
fk(1, bk) = 3−
3∑
i=1
fi(ai, 1)−
3∑
i=1
fi(1, bi)
By the definition of a division function, the left side of the first equation is at least zero.
Proposition 3. If f is an exact, impartial division function and ai, bi ∈ [0,+∞] for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then ∑3i=1 fi(ai, bi) ≤ 2.
Proof: By (2), for (i, j, k) ∈ T ,
fi(ai, bi) = 1− fj( 1bi , 1)− fk(1, 1ai )
= 1− (1− fk(1, 1)− fi(1, bi))− (1− fi(ai, 1)− fj(1, 1))
Then summing over T ,∑3
i=1 fi(ai, bi) = 3− 6 + 2
∑3
i=1 fi(1, 1) +
∑3
i=1 fi(ai, 1) +
∑3
i=1 fi(1, bi)
By Propositions 1 and 2∑3
i=1 fi(ai, bi) ≤ 3− 6 + 2 + 3 = 2.
Corollary 1. If f is an exact, impartial division function, then for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
fi(a, b) ≤ 2/3 for all a, b ∈ [0,+∞].
Proof: Fix  > 0 and for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} choose ai, bi ∈ [0,+∞] such that fi(ai, bi) ≥
sup fi −  = sup{fi(x, y): x, y ∈ [0,∞]} − . By Proposition 3,
∑3
i=1 fi(ai, bi) ≤ 2.
Therefore, fi(ai, bi) ≤ 2/3 for some i. For this i, sup fi ≤ 23 + . Therefore, for some i,
sup fi ≤ 2/3.
Definition. The deviation from consensuality of a division function f is D(f) =
sup{|fi(r)− 11+rj
k,i
+rk
j,i
| : r is a peer evaluation profile and (i, j, k) ∈ T}.
We so define deviation from consensuality because de Clippel et al. (2008) showed that
the unique impartial, consensual division function is fi(r) = 11+rj
k,i
+rk
j,i
for (i, j, k) ∈ T .
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Corollary 2. The deviation from consensuality of an exact, impartial division function is
at least 1/3.
Proof. Suppose f is an exact, impartial division function. Then D(f) ≥ |fi(0, 0)− 11+0+0 |
for i = 1, 2, 3. By Corollary 1, there is an i such that fi(0, 0) ≤ 23 . Then D(f) ≥ |23 − 1| =
1
3 .
To see that the bounds in Proposition 2 and 3 and Corollary 1 and especially Corollary
2 are tight, consider the following example.
Example 1. For (i, j, k) ∈ T , let
Fi(r
j
k,i, r
k
j,i) =
1
6
(
2 +
1− rjk,i
1 + rjk,i
+
1− rkj,i
1 + rkj,i
)
We have chosen this function because it is the simplest division function satisfying the
properties we are about to establish for it. Clearly, F is impartial. That F is exact follows
from the fact that for (i, j, k) ∈ T , 1−r
i
j,k
1+ri
j,k
+
1−rik,j
1+ri
j,k
= 0 (recall that rij,k =
1
ri
k,j
). For
this example, Fi(0, 1) = Fi(1, 0) = 12 and Fi(0, 0) =
2
3
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In addition, F
is symmetric with respect to agents (by which is meant Fi(a, b) = Fj(a, b) = Fj(b, a) for
i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and a, b ∈ [0,+∞]); and Fi is decreasing in rjk,i and rkj,i for (i, j, k) ∈ T .
Finally, we will show that D(F ) = 13 . Let E(x, y) =
1
6
(
2 + 1−x1+x +
1−y
1+y
)
− 11+x+y so
that D(F ) = sup |E| on [0,+∞]× [0,+∞]. In fact sup |E| = max |E| since E is continuous
on [0,+∞] × [0,+∞]. We will first work on the boundary of [0,+∞] × [0,+∞]. There,
E(x, 0) = 16 (3 +
1−x
1+x ) − 11+x = x−13(1+x) so that E(x, 0) is increasing from E(0, 0) = −13
to E(+∞, 0) = 1
3
. Next E(x,+∞) = 1
6
(2 + 1−x
1+x
− 1) = 1
3(1+x)
so that E(x,+∞) is
decreasing from E(0,+∞) = 13 to E(+∞,+∞) = 0. On the boundary of [0,+∞]×[0,+∞],
max(|E|) = 13 and the maximum occurs at (0, 0), (+∞, 0) and (0,+∞).
In the interior of [0,+∞] × [0,+∞], setting ∂E
∂x
= ∂E
∂y
= 0 and solving, x0 = y0 =
1 +
√
3. For the only candidate for a maximum of |E| in the interior, E(x0, y0) = .024.
In summary, the deviation from consensuality for F is 13 and occurs when agent i is
rated rjk,i = r
k
j,i = 0 in which case agent i is underpaid compared to a consensual division,
or when agent i is rated rjk,i = 0 and r
k
j,i = +∞, or rjk,i = +∞ and rkj,i = 0 in which case
agent i is overpaid compared to a consensual division.
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5. Concluding Remarks.
Notice that for our division function F , extreme overpayment or underpayment com-
pared to consensual payment occurs only for extreme peer evaluations. For example, the
most extreme underpayment of 1
3
occurs only when an agent is rated +∞ compared to
both players, and the most extreme overpayment of 13 occurs only in the even more unusual
case when an agent is rated 0 compared to one associate and +∞ compared to another.
On the other hand, for the less extreme consistent evaluation profile (r123, r
2
31, r
3
12) =
( 12 , 4,
1
2) the exact, impartial division function of Example 1 overpays agent 1 by 3
1
2 cents
compared to the impartial, consensual division function, overpays agent 2 by 434 cents and
underpays agent three by 81
4
cents.
7
References
1. Brams, S. J., Jones, M. A., and Klamler, C. (2006). Better ways to cut a cake: Notices
of the American Mathematical Association, 53, 1314-1321.
2. de Clippel, G., Moulin, H., and Tideman, N. (2008). Impartial division of a dollar:
Journal of Economic Theory , 139, 176-191.
3. Thomson, W. (2003). Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy: Mathe-
matical Social Sciences, 45, 249-297.
4. Tideman, T. N., and Plassmann, F. (2008). Paying the partners: Public Choice, 136,
19-37.
8
